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   PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 15-2729 
________________ 
 
S.B., A Minor By Her Parent and  
Legal Guardian Azania Muwwakkil; 
AZANIA MUWWAKKIL, In Her Own Right, 
                                                           Appellants 
v. 
 
KINDERCARE LEARNING CENTERS, LLC 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. No. 2-15-cv-01499) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 1, 2016 
 
Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN & SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 10, 2016) 
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Rhonda H. Wilson, Esq. 
Suite 820 
1500 John F. Kennedy Blvd. 
Two Penn Center Plaza 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
  Counsel for Appellants 
 
Edward A. Greenberg, Esq. 
Kristin A. Topolewski, Esq. 
Ward Greenberg 
1835 Market Street 
Suite 650 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
  Counsel for Appellee 
______________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________ 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
S.B. and Azania Muwwakkil appeal from an order of 
the District Court granting in part and denying in part their 
motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.  For the 
reasons that follow, we lack jurisdiction and will dismiss the 
appeal. 
 
I. 
S.B., a minor, was allegedly injured at a daycare center 
operated by Appellee KinderCare Learning Centers, LLC 
(“KinderCare”) when another child tore a hair braid from her 
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scalp.  Based on this incident, her mother, Muwwakkil, 
retained counsel and filed a complaint against KinderCare in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.  The 
complaint alleged that KinderCare is responsible for S.B.’s 
injuries because it was negligent in operating the daycare 
center.  KinderCare removed the action to the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 
After removal, Muwwakkil retained a different 
attorney who promptly filed a motion for voluntary dismissal 
without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41.  According to counsel, the lawsuit was prematurely filed 
because S.B., as a four-year-old, is too young to articulate 
details about the alleged incident and how it has affected her.  
KinderCare opposed the motion.  The District Court granted 
the motion in part, denied the motion in part, and dismissed 
the case without prejudice.  In doing so, the District Court 
imposed two conditions on the right of S.B. and Muwwakkil 
to refile the case: (1) that they pay KinderCare reasonable 
attorneys’ fees, to be determined by the District Court upon 
receiving an affidavit of costs; and (2) that they refile their 
complaint by June 24, 2019, approximately four years from 
the date of the order, with the possibility of extending that 
deadline by a showing of good cause.  Instead of submitting 
an objection to KinderCare’s affidavit of costs, and before the 
District Court entered a final order, S.B. and Muwwakkil 
filed the instant appeal challenging the imposition of these 
conditions on their right to refile. 
 
II. 
 
Our jurisdiction is limited generally to reviewing the 
“final decisions” of district courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final 
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decision is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”  
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) 
(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).  
Typically, a dismissal without prejudice is not a final decision 
because the plaintiff may refile the complaint, thereby 
creating the risk of “piecemeal” appellate litigation.1  Camesi 
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 
2013).  This is particularly true where, as here, the party 
appealing is a plaintiff who moved for voluntary dismissal 
under Rule 41(a)(2).  See Empire Volkswagen Inc. v. World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 
Although we have not yet had occasion to consider it, 
other courts have applied an exception to this jurisdictional 
bar where a district court dismisses a case without prejudice 
but, in doing so, imposes unreasonably onerous conditions on 
the plaintiff’s right to refile the dismissed action.  These 
courts have used the term “legal prejudice” to describe such 
conditions.  See, e.g., LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 
601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding legal prejudice where, as an 
                                              
1 A plaintiff who agrees to “stand” on the dismissed 
complaint by refraining from refiling the same action may 
obtain appellate review because there is no risk of multiple 
appeals.  Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 
F.2d 1150, 1156-57 (3d Cir. 1986).  Here, however, the 
assertion of S.B. and Muwwakkil that they “will stand on the 
complaint” is of no consequence.  See Appellant’s Br. at 8.  
They cannot stand on their complaint when they have made it 
clear that they plan to refile a different complaint in the 
future. 
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additional condition of refiling, plaintiff was required to 
“prove his case preliminarily to the district court” by 
“affirmatively demonstrat[ing] that the case should be 
reopened and that he possesses a valid cause of action”); 
Versa Prods., Inc. v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 387 F.3d 1325, 
1327-28 (11th Cir. 2004) (no legal prejudice where payment 
of attorney’s fees was condition of refiling); Duffy v. Ford 
Motor Co., 218 F.3d 623, 627-29 (6th Cir. 2000) (no legal 
prejudice where conditions were the imposition of fees and 
the requirement that evidentiary rulings of dismissed action 
would apply prospectively to any refiled action); Bowers v. 
St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 668 F.2d 369, 369 (8th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam) (no legal prejudice where condition was that lawsuit, 
if refiled, must be brought in “either the state or federal courts 
of Arkansas”). 
 
The legal prejudice exception is consistent with case 
law in this circuit holding that a dismissal without prejudice 
may be appealed under circumstances where the plaintiff’s 
ability to refile is foreclosed.  See, e.g., Ahmed v. Dragovich, 
297 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that an order 
dismissing a case without prejudice was a final, appealable 
order where the statute of limitations had expired and any 
attempt at refiling would have been unsuccessful); Welch v. 
Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 1991) (summarizing 
circuit authority concerning circumstances where dismissal 
without prejudice was appealable).  We therefore follow other 
circuits in adopting the legal prejudice exception to the final 
judgment rule. 
 
This case, however, does not fall within the legal 
prejudice exception because the conditions imposed by the 
District Court do not “severely circumscribe” or render 
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“uncertain” the ability of S.B. and Muwwakkil to refile their 
complaint.  LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 604.   
 
First, the requirement that S.B. and Muwwakkil pay 
KinderCare reasonable attorneys’ fees is a commonly 
imposed prerequisite to refiling that courts have held does not 
typically trigger an exception to the rule that we review only 
final decisions.  See Versa Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d at 1328; 
Duffy, 218 F.3d at 628.  But see Cauley v. Wilson, 754 F.2d 
769, 771 (7th Cir. 1985).  Some courts have held that the 
imposition of costs may constitute legal prejudice when the 
amount of the costs imposed is so high as to be objectively 
unreasonable.  Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 131 
(5th Cir. 1978) (“There will be cases in which the amount of 
money set as the price of a voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice is so clearly unreasonable as to amount to 
appealable ‘legal prejudice’ or to warrant review through a 
prerogative writ.”); Duffy, 218 F.3d at 628 (“[W]e conclude 
that an appealing party must show that a cost condition is 
objectively unreasonable, without regard to that party’s 
financial means, in order to demonstrate legal prejudice.”).  In 
this case, however, the amount of costs imposed remains 
undetermined because S.B. and Muwwakkil filed their notice 
of appeal without submitting an objection to KinderCare’s 
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affidavit of costs and before the District Court entered a final 
order specifying the amount to be awarded.2 
 
Second, the condition that S.B. and Muwwakkil refile 
their case by June 24, 2019, does not amount to legal 
prejudice because it does not result in uncertainty as to 
whether they will be permitted to refile their action.  S.B. and 
Muwwakkil are correct that, were it not for this condition, 
Pennsylvania’s applicable statute of limitations would not 
expire until S.B.’s twentieth birthday.  Rule 41(a), however, 
authorizes the District Court to condition a voluntary 
dismissal “on terms that the court considers proper,” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41, as long as they are designed to protect the 
defendant and do not create burdensome obstacles to refiling, 
see Versa Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d at 1327-28.  Here, the 
District Court imposed a deadline on refiling to accommodate 
KinderCare’s concern that defending against a refiled lawsuit 
would become increasingly difficult with the passage of time.  
The Court, however, emphasized that the deadline can be 
                                              
2 The fact that there is no final order identifying the 
amount of costs imposed is an additional reason we lack 
jurisdiction.  The order under review states only that S.B. and 
Muwwakkil must pay “Defendant reasonable attorneys’ fees 
and costs as determined by the Court.”  App. at 3.  Without 
knowing what fees (if any) the District Court might find are 
“reasonable,” we lack a basis for review.  See Duffy, 218 F.3d 
at 626 (explaining case history and noting that previously 
dismissed appeal would have been “premature” because “the 
amount of fees payable to the defendant had not yet been 
specified”). 
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extended for good cause, considering such factors as S.B.’s 
cognitive ability and readiness to proceed. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal does not qualify 
for an exception to the final judgment rule.  Accordingly, we 
will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.3  In holding that this 
appeal is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we express no opinion 
                                              
3 In doing so, we note that S.B. and Muwwakkil are 
not permanently foreclosed from obtaining appellate review 
of the conditions imposed by the District Court.  For instance, 
an order dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to 
comply with these conditions would constitute a final, 
appealable order.  See Mortg. Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Richard 
Carlyon Co., 904 F.2d 298, 301 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Another 
option traditionally open to a plaintiff who disagrees with the 
conditions imposed by the court upon a Rule 41(a)(2) 
dismissal is to refuse to comply with the condition.  In such a 
case, the court may convert the dismissal into a dismissal with 
prejudice.  The dismissal would then be appealable as a 
decision on the merits.”); Herring v. City of Whitehall, 804 
F.2d 464, 466 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1986) (permitting appeal from 
dismissal with prejudice ordered after plaintiffs failed to 
comply with condition that they pay attorney’s fees upon 
refiling a case voluntarily dismissed under Rule 41); Yoffe, 
580 F.2d at 131 n.13. 
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as to the merits (i.e., whether imposing these particular 
conditions was an abuse of discretion).4
                                              
4 As an alternative basis for jurisdiction, S.B. and 
Muwwakkil argue that the collateral order doctrine permits us 
to hear their appeal.  One of the requirements for the 
collateral order doctrine to apply is that the issues raised must 
be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”  We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 
324 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).  Here, there 
has been no showing that the propriety of the conditions 
imposed on the right of S.B. and Muwwakkil to refile is an 
issue that is “effectively unreviewable,” or that this appeal 
otherwise “falls within the ‘narrow class of decisions that do 
not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of 
achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as 
final.’”  New Jersey, Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Inv. v. Fuld, 
604 F.3d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Digital Equip. 
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)). 
